All politics are local
Foreign policy does not operate in a vacuum. As the late US Speaker Tip O’Neill famously observed, all politics is local. This truism remains valid even in moments of international crisis. With midterm elections approaching, domestic considerations shape decision-making in Washington. Voters are weary of distant wars with unclear purpose. Markets react sharply to instability. Energy prices, investor confidence, and economic sentiment matter. Strength plays well in domestic politics. Open-ended wars do not. This helps explain the tension between rhetoric and restraint that characterises the present moment.
The regional paradox
As I have argued elsewhere the confrontation involving Iran, Israel and the US is not episodic but systemic. It is part of a deeper strategic recomposition of the Middle East – including the Gulf – in which old diplomatic frameworks are eroding and deterrence increasingly substitutes for diplomacy.
Regional actors face a dilemma rarely acknowledged in public debate. Many want Iran contained, deterred and constrained. Some advocate outright regime change. But few want Iran shattered. Saudi Arabia’s recalibration reflects this tension. Public calls for restraint coexist with private warnings that inaction could embolden Tehran. Israel’s posture is similarly layered. Its core objectives remain unchanged, but current restraint reflects tactical judgement rather than strategic retreat. Timing and risk matter.
At the same time, regional diplomacy is also in motion. Oman hosted a first round of indirect US-Iran talks on February 6 – a shift from Istanbul that Tehran insisted upon, following earlier facilitation efforts by Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and others. Washington and Tehran signaled a willingness to continue engagement.
The fact that indirect talks have taken place does not mean that Washington has accepted a nuclear-only frame. On the contrary, the core divergence over ballistic missiles, regional behavior and support for non-state actors remains unresolved – a point the US underlined by announcing fresh oil and petrochemical sanctions within hours of the talks’ conclusion. What this underscores is that even at moments of acute tension, diplomatic channels remain active. Deterrence and dialogue now operate in parallel, often uneasily.
The paradox is simple. A triumphant Iran is dangerous. A chaotic Iran may be worse. Fragmentation, proxy escalation and uncontrollable retaliation would place the region on permanent edge. Stability and predictability – not victory – remain the unspoken regional demand.
The EU’s quiet alarm
The EU watches the crisis with particular unease – and Cyprus feels it immediately. Any major conflict involving Iran would produce direct consequences: energy, trade and financial disruptions, migration flows and renewed instability across the Mediterranean and the Levant, affecting economic stability, security planning and regional credibility in real time. At a time when the EU is already stretched by the war in Ukraine, the demands of defense rearmament, and an increasingly unpredictable US decision-making environment, a Middle East war would not be a distant theatre. It would be felt quickly and directly.
This explains Europe’s emphasis on de-escalation and diplomacy. It is not naïveté. It is vulnerability. It is strategic prudence.
Russia, China and nuclear proliferation
The growing coordination between Iran, Russia and China adds another layer of complexity. Joint military exercises scheduled among Iran, Russia and China, together with political signaling, do not amount to a formal alliance. Moscow and Beijing are unlikely to fight for Tehran, but they benefit from Western distraction and strategic overload.
Escalation hardens blocs, narrows diplomatic space, and accelerates the fragmentation of an already strained international order. A wider conflict would therefore serve interests well beyond the region – and not those of stability. One likely global consequence, particularly if a US strike on Iran coincides with the protracted war in Ukraine, is the erosion – if not collapse – of the remaining institutional constraints on nuclear proliferation. The expiration on February 5, 2026 of the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) between the US and Russia, leaving the two largest nuclear arsenals without binding limits, underscores how fragile those constraints have become.
The deterrence lesson drawn by many actors is stark. Iran was struck during the 12-day war last June precisely because it did not yet possess nuclear weapons; nuclear-armed states such as North Korea are not. For Iran, and for other astute observers, this reinforces a dangerous but rational conclusion: that nuclear capability, not compliance, is the ultimate guarantor against intervention. That lesson, once absorbed, does not remain confined to one case. It spreads – and with it, the logic of proliferation.
The unanswered question: the day after
The most conspicuously unanswered question is the day after an attack on Iran. What follows a strike? What replaces the current order if it collapses? Regime change is a slogan, not a plan. Nuclear knowledge cannot be bombed away. Proxy networks do not disappear with command centres. Fragmentation creates vacuums that history shows are quickly filled, rarely benignly.
The danger, therefore, is not simply escalation, but consequence without ownership. When the political end state is undefined, force risks becoming an act of demonstration rather than an instrument of strategy. In diplomacy, there is rarely a final full stop. Only pauses, recalibrations, and the continuing necessity to shape an agreement both sides can own – the only kind capable of outlasting escalation.
